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National Parliaments as Political Safeguards of Federalism: 
Interparliamentary Cooperation in the EU, the US and Switzerland 
 
Katarzyna Granat
*
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter studies the role of parliaments at non-central level in federal systems. To this end, it analyses 
the function of US State legislatures, national parliaments (NPs) in the EU and Swiss cantonal 
parliaments as ‘political safeguards of federalism’. This notion, introduced by Herbert Wechsler in the US 
context, describes the mechanisms that offer States protection from federal overreach and focuses on the 
role of States in the appointment and composition of the central government.
1
 The aim of the ‘political 
safeguarding of federalism’ is to maintain an optimal balance between the States and federal government 
rather than to advance State autonomy, thereby seeking to ‘achieve a well-functioning national 
democracy’.2 
The chapter adopts a comparative perspective in order to gain insights from the American and Swiss 
experiences that could inform the ongoing debate on the strengthening of NPs in EU affairs through 
interparliamentary cooperation.
3
 The comparison is based upon the wider notion of a federal union, under 
which the EU can be classified. As Schütze explains, the EU stands on a federal ‘middle ground’, since it 
has a ‘mixed or compound structure […] combining international and national elements’.4 He does not 
follow the view that the EU’s federal tradition of indivisible sovereignty implies a notion of a federation 
as a national state. Instead, he argues that the federal label can be applied beyond the state and that it 
encapsulates the idea of a ‘Federation of States’. This chapter takes this broader approach and adopts the 
view that the subsidiarity principle, strengthened by the scrutiny of NPs, represents the EU’s own political 
safeguard of federalism that allows for comparisons with similar safeguards in other federal systems.
5
 
In the EU, concerns over a ‘democratic deficit’6 and the so-called ‘competence creep’7 led the drafters of 
the Lisbon Treaty to grant NPs an oversight function with respect to the compliance of EU draft 
legislative acts with the principle of subsidiarity.
8
 More than this, as explained by Lindseth, the 
reinforcement of the role of NPs within the EU legislative process was grounded in a ‘democratic 
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disconnect’ between EU institutions and EU citizens.9 This disconnect arose from the assertion that, for 
cultural and historical reasons, it is the national level that ultimately enjoys the highest degree of 
democratic legitimacy, and without more involvement of NPs, the EU would remain disconnected from 
this source of legitimacy. This stands in contrast to the idea of the ‘democratic deficit’, which 
concentrates solely on the democratisation of EU institutions independently of the national level. This 
chapter departs from this approach and argues that efforts towards greater democratisation of the EU 
should focus on enhancing the linkages between EU institutions that produce legal norms and the national 
level that oversees these institutions. 
The involvement of NPs was also partly inspired by disappointment with the jurisprudence of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union, and its fulfilment of the function of judicial guardian of subsidiarity.
10
 
Its jurisprudence on the subsidiarity principle
11
 has been subject to strong criticism, especially the Court’s 
reluctance to ‘deal with subsidiarity frontally’ and the Court’s ‘misleading application’ of this principle 
by focusing on the procedural dimension of subsidiarity instead of conducting a cost/benefit test of the 
necessity of EU action.
12
 Moreover, the Court’s case law is labelled a ‘drafting guide’, meaning that as 
long as EU institutions use the Court’s vague vocabulary and draft EU legislation accordingly, the Court 
will not annul such acts on the grounds of a violation of subsidiarity.
13
 To address such concerns about 
democratic legitimacy and the insufficient contribution of the Court to address the challenges facing EU 
legislative action, the Lisbon Treaty introduced the so-called early warning system (EWS), granting NPs 
the role of ‘watchdogs’ of subsidiarity.14 The EWS creates a link between EU institutions and NPs by 
involving the latter in the subsidiarity control of draft legislation put forward by the European 
Commission. 
In contrast to the EU, no mechanism similar to the EWS exists in the US or Swiss constitutional systems. 
Nonetheless, State legislatures and cantonal parliaments have also taken an active role in safeguarding 
balanced relations between States and the federation and between cantons respectively. This chapter 
focuses on fiscal federalism in the US, horizontal federalism in Switzerland, and the contribution of 
interparliamentary cooperation to the safeguarding of the federal structure of government. Section 2 
discusses Wechsler’s notion of ‘political safeguards of federalism’. With regard to the US, the focus will 
be on the question of the level of government that should bear the cost of implementing federal 
legislation.
15
 Specifically, Section 3 studies the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act (UMRA) of 1995 that 
aims to limit the practice of imposing federal unfunded mandates on State and local governments. In 
general terms, an unfunded mandate is a compulsory federal law that requires a State or local government 
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to perform certain actions without providing federal funding for it.
16
 For instance, the 1990 Americans 
with Disabilities Act obliges state and local governments to make buildings accessible to disabled people 
and to finance it from their own budgets. This section also explores the role of the National Conference of 
State Legislatures (NCSL), an ‘informal political safeguard of federalism’, in the operation of the 
unfunded mandate in the US federal system, and draws parallels and highlights differences with the 
involvement of NPs in the EWS.
17
 Section 4 studies the involvement of the Swiss cantonal parliaments in 
issues related to federalism. Although sufficient political safeguards of federalism seem to be in force in 
Switzerland, when it comes to intercantonal treaties, intercantonal parliamentary cooperation is still 
developing. To respond to the dominance of cantonal executives in this aspect of horizontal federalism, 
cantonal parliaments have launched a number of regional conferences, while a national conference is 
underway. Finally, Section 5 offers insights from the functioning of the NCSL and Swiss conferences for 
the involvement of NPs within the EU system. The key finding of the chapter is that, in all of the cases 
studied, interparliamentary cooperation was used by the legislatures to strengthen their position in the 
relations between the parliament and government in the system of vertical (the EU and the US) or 
horizontal (Switzerland) federalism. 
2.  Political Safeguards of Federalism 
2.1 US Political Safeguards of Federalism 
In Wechsler’s view, the political safeguards of federalism serve to prevent or limit intrusions by the 
federal government on the realm of the States.
18
 As a consequence, courts do not need to police 
federalism on behalf of States because the latter are adequately represented in Congress.
19
  
First, according to Wechsler, the US federal tradition ‘supports placing the burden of persuasion on those 
urging national action’.20 Second, States play a central role in the selection and composition of the federal 
parliament and government. Specifically, members of both houses of Congress are elected on the basis of 
electoral districts formed across the States and, as such, are politically accountable to the voters of their 
home State,
21
 although the Senate only became directly elected after the 17
th
 Amendment of the US 
Constitution adopted in 1913. Furthermore, the US President is elected by electors appointed by each 
individual State.
22
 Third, the equality of States in the Senate enables the blocking of legislation by a 
coalition of States whose population is just a fraction of the total number of citizens.
23
 In the same vein, 
States can influence the House of Representatives through State control over voters’ qualifications 
(criteria by which people are eligible to vote) and districting (the redrawing of borders between electoral 
                                                 
16
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Service’ available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40957.pdf. 
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20
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21
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districts).
24
 While the former means of State influence is arguably severely restricted by the prohibitions 
against the denial of franchise, especially by virtue of the 15
th
 and 19
th
 Amendments, the latter means 
remains prevalent today under the label of gerrymandering. Finally, Wechsler argues that although the US 
President is the ‘repository of “national spirit” in the central government’, due to his or her election by the 
Electoral College, he or she is also required to be ‘responsive to local values that have large support 
within the [S]tates’.25 
The political safeguards have been negatively assessed in the literature since State legislatures do not 
have any important powers in federal elections except for setting residence requirements, which is 
difficult to transform into an effective way to influence national policy.
26
 At the same time, the US 
President’s veto power over federal legislation is more a sign of his or her competition for power with the 
States rather than of responsiveness to local values.
27
 Other critics point out that the political safeguards 
are ‘ahistorical’, since the Framers saw the Constitution as providing for judicial review of the balance of 
power between the national and State levels; while it is a historical fact, it is argued, that the political 
safeguards were not the only safeguards of federalism.
28
  
Wechsler’s notion of the political safeguards of federalism was relied on by the US Supreme Court in the 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority case, which concerned the question of whether, 
under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause, Congress could extend to State and local governments the 
Fair Labor Standards Act requiring minimum wage and overtime pay for employees.
29
 The US Supreme 
Court decided that the political safeguards of federalism provided sufficient protection from federal 
commerce power that would excessively burden the States. However, the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Powell, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, pointed out that Wechsler’s 
view that the structure of the federal government sufficiently protects the States did not reflect the current 
state of affairs.
30
 Their opinion is echoed in the literature: the adoption of the 17
th
 Amendment, although 
acknowledged by Wechsler, directs the attention of Senators towards national rather than State issues.
31
 
Others argue that, despite this change, the Senate still protects federalism because Senators participate in 
federal lawmaking procedures to the same extent as prior to this amendment.
32
 
A number of US scholars understand the system of political parties as a political safeguard of federalism. 
Although they are focused on the election process of their members rather than on the political program 
of those members and although they lack a strong centralised organisation, political parties work together 
at all levels so that the party’s candidate is elected.33 They influence federalism by creating political 
frameworks where politicians at different levels of government depend upon each other to get elected and 
stay in office.
34
 Specifically, political parties act as safeguards of federalism by focusing on long-term 
                                                 
24
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 ibid, 558. 
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 J Pittenger, ‘Garcia and the Political Safeguards of Federalism: Is there a Better Solution to the Conundrum of the 
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 See J C Yoo, ‘The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism’ (1996) 70 S Cal L Rev 1311, 1357 and 1381. 
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benefits and developing priorities of a national rather than local character.
35
  Moreover, implementation of 
federal statutes is perceived as an important way for States to protect their powers. Specifically, major 
pieces of federal legislation, such as the Affordable Care Act of 2010, require implementation by the 
States and this empowers them to ‘limit or shape the federalization of government functions’.36 Finally, 
the scholarship identifies ‘informal political safeguards of federalism’ and defines them as ‘informal 
modes of intergovernmental representation through which State officials apprise federal policymakers of 
the interests of State governments’.37 While sharing Wechsler’s idea that representation is key to the 
preservation of the authority of State governments, Nugent argues that the best safeguards in this respect 
are State officials themselves rather than members of Congress or the US President.
38
 This chapter 
focuses on NCLS, which gathers officials of State legislatures. 
2.2. Swiss Political Safeguards of Federalism 
The Swiss Constitution foresees that ‘[t]he principle of subsidiarity must be observed in the allocation and 
performance of state tasks’.39 However, in contrast to the EU, no safeguards similar to the EWS have 
been introduced in Switzerland. Instead, a number of other mechanisms are in force that might be seen as 
political safeguards of federalism. 
First, the Council of States, the Upper House of the Swiss Federal Assembly, consists of representatives 
of cantons elected according to the rules set by each canton.
40
 Currently, in almost all cantons members of 
the Council of States are elected through direct elections at the same time as members of the National 
Council, the Lower House of the Federal Assembly.
41
 As a consequence, members of the Council of 
States represent the citizens of their own canton, and not necessarily the canton as such.
42
  
Second, in the realm of direct democracy, a referendum is necessary for the passage of amendments to the 
Federal Constitution, for the accession of Switzerland to international organisations, and for emergency 
federal acts that do not have a constitutional basis and that are valid for more than one year. Such a 
referendum requires a majority of votes of both ‘the People and cantons’ – thus, a double majority.43  
In addition to the Council of States and the referendum procedures, cantons can directly participate in the 
shaping of federal legislation through the petition process. This allows a number of constitutional actors, 
                                                 
35
 J Bednar, The Robust Federation (CUP 2008) 116. On political parties as political safeguards see also S Jenkins 
and D D Roscoe, ‘Parties as the Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Impact of Local Party Activity on National 
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 J D Nugent, ‘The Informal Political Safeguards of Federalism’ (2002) at 3 
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 ibid, 4. 
39
 Art 5a of Swiss Constitution.  
40
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41
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2008) 39. 
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including the cantons, to submit a legislative proposal to the Federal Assembly.
44
 Moreover, eight cantons 
may start a referendum procedure against a federal law within 100 days of the official publication of the 
act.
45
 In 2003, eleven cantons, in an effort coordinated by the Conference of Cantonal Governments, 
which is a political platform gathering cantonal executives, successfully triggered this mechanism against 
a tax reform that would have significantly decreased the tax revenues of cantons.
46
 This case exemplifies 
the fact that cantons can be veto players in the federal legislative process if they coordinate their action.
47
  
Finally, in contrast to the EU and US systems, the Swiss Constitution does not provide for judicial review 
of the constitutionality of federal laws, although some attempts were made to introduce such a 
procedure.
48
 Specifically, the institution of referendum itself led to the rejection of such judicial 
safeguards of federalism.
49
 In a 1939 referendum, the Swiss people rejected a constitutional amendment 
put forward by means of the popular initiative which sought ‘protection of the constitutional rights of the 
citizens (expansion of the constitutional jurisdiction)’ and which thus proposed the introduction of 
constitutional review of federal legislation.
50
 In consequence, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland 
cannot review acts of the Federal Parliament for their compatibility with the Swiss Constitution, but 
enacted federal acts can be subject to referendum if at least 50.000 people or eight cantons request it.
51
 
Such referendums play an important role in preventing violations of cantonal powers guaranteed in the 
Constitution.
52 
2.3 EU Political Safeguards of Federalism 
Within the EU, it is the principle of subsidiarity that acts as a political safeguard of federalism.
53
 To this 
end, the Lisbon Treaty granted NPs a role in the enforcement of this principle through the EWS, anchored 
in Articles 6 and 7 of Protocol no. 2.
54
 Hence, in contrast to the US and Switzerland, NPs are tasked with 
the operationalisation of the political safeguards of federalism in the EU legal order. 
The EWS procedure allows NPs to submit, within eight weeks of the date of transmission of a draft EU 
legislative act, a reasoned opinion to the Commission explaining why the draft does not comply with 
subsidiarity. Depending on the number of reasoned opinions, which count as votes (each chamber of a 
bicameral parliament has one vote, while unicameral parliaments have two votes), NPs may trigger two 
                                                 
44
 Art 160(1) of Swiss Constitution. However, bills initiated by cantons in the framework of  the ‘parliamentary 
initiative’ constitute a very small portion of all bills. See Kriesi and Trechsel, The Politics of Switzerland (n 42) 39. 
45
 Art 141 of Swiss Constitution.  
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 W Linder and I Steffen, ‘Swiss Confederation’ in K Le Roy and C Saunders (eds.), Legislative, Executive, and 
Judicial Governance in Federal Countries (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006) 308. 
47
 Kriesi and Trechsel, The Politics of Switzerland (n 42) 40. 
48
 E C Ritaine and A-S Papeil, ‘Federalism and Legal Unification in Switzerland’ in D Halberstam and M Reimann 
(eds), Federalism and Legal Unification (Springer, 2014) 453. 
49
 D Halberstam, ‘Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary’ in G A Caldeira, R D Kelemen, and K E 
Whittington (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (OUP 2010) 147. 
50
 Eidgenössische Volksinitiative Wahrung der verfassungsmässigen Rechte der Bürger (Erweiterung der 
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit) available at https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vis40.html. See also T Fleiner, 
‘Constitutional Revision: The Case of Switzerland’ in X Contiades (ed), Engineering Constitutional Change 
(Routledge 2013) 343. 
51
 Art 141 of Swiss Constitution.  
52
 T Fleiner, ‘The Current Situation of Federalism in Switzerland’ (2009) 9 Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals 
51, 61. 
53
 Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism (n 4) 243.  
54
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procedures. First, in the procedure labelled the ‘yellow card’, if the number of reasoned opinions reaches 
at least one third of all the votes allocated to NPs, or one quarter of the votes for the proposals in the area 
of freedom, security and justice, the Commission may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft, 
giving reasons for its decision. Second, in the procedure commonly referred to as the ‘orange card’, if 
reasoned opinions represent at least the majority of votes assigned to NPs, the Commission may, again, 
decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft. If it maintains the draft, a majority of 55% of the votes 
in the Council or a majority of the votes cast in the European Parliament (EP) is required to halt the 
legislative procedure. Furthermore, the so-called ‘political dialogue’ initiated in 2006 by the President of 
the Commission José Manuel Barroso, and hence often referred to as ‘Barroso Initiative’, complements 
the exchange between NPs and the Commission beyond the EWS.
55
 
3. The Interparliamentary Cooperation in the US 
In the EU, subsidiarity monitoring was introduced to ensure democratic oversight over the exercise of 
non-exclusive EU competences. In the US, State legislatures did not develop such a mechanism because 
of the well-established review of competence exercised by the US Supreme Court, the existence of a set 
of political safeguards of federalism, and the lack of a similar democratic deficit problem. This does not 
mean, however, that there is no role for State legislatures in US federalism. The US case could actually 
provide useful insights for the EU debate on subsidiarity and this is examined below with the example of 
fiscal federalism, introduction of UMRA and the role of the NCSL.
56 
3.1. Unfunded Mandates: Rationale and Contents 
The goal of UMRA was to limit the practice whereby a federal unfunded mandate is imposed upon State 
and local governments, and to raise awareness about the fiscal impact that federal legislation has on the 
States. Due to a shift in its approach in the 1970s and 1980s, the federal government was introducing 
more intrusive compulsory programs and regulations requiring compliance by States and smaller entities 
(localities).
57
 UMRA was supposed to prevent federal legislation and regulation from imposing costly 
obligations on States and localities.
58
 More specifically, the objective was to reduce the number of 
unfunded mandates and provide Congress with information on the costs of federal legislation leading to a 
more informed decision-making process in this institution.
59
 Arguments against UMRA were that broad 
national issues – such as those in the fields of the environment, the economy, health, immigration and 
education – demand national solutions, which necessitate the adoption of unfunded mandates.60 
Moreover, in order to avoid ‘[S]tate shopping’, certain issues of an interstate nature need to be addressed 
at the federal level.
61
 Finally, it was underlined that federal mandates dictate the necessary minimum 
requirements (‘floors’) in some regulatory areas, such as the environment or workplace conditions.62 
                                                 
55
 D Jančić, ‘The Game of Cards: National Parliaments in the EU and the Future of the Early Warning System and 
the Political Dialogue’ (2015) 52 CML Rev 939, 948 ff. 
56
 R W Adler, ‘Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique’ (1997) 50 Vanderbilt L Rev 1137.  
57
 Dilger and Beth, ‘Unfunded Mandates Reform Act’ (n 16 above) 2. 
58
 ibid. 
59
 S Anderson & R Constantine, ‘Unfunded mandates’ Briefing Paper No. 7, Harvard Law School, p 13, available at 
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60
 Congressional Record, Senate, Senator Lautenberg, 12 January 1995, p 862. 
61
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By introducing several reforms, UMRA addressed the problems arising from the fact that the federal 
government may require a State government to take action without allocating funds for the latter to cover 
the costs associated with it. UMRA is thus supposed to make it harder to enact unfunded mandates.
63
 The 
Act proposes specific tools to achieve this, such as information requirements and the point of order vote, 
which are discussed in turn below.  
First, the information requirements demand for Congress to be better informed about the cost of 
mandates. UMRA requires from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to prepare information 
statements on the mandates and their costs.
64
 This obligation should arguably make it easier to solve 
problems related to collective action and free-riding.
65
 
Second, UMRA establishes a congressional point of order against legislation containing significant 
federal government mandates without providing funding for their implementation and on bills that lack a 
CBO assessment. If a point of order is raised and accepted, it will be debated for 20 minutes followed by 
a vote on whether to continue consideration of the legislation. Such a vote is seen as a ‘speed bump’, 
allowing members of Congress to initiate debate and a vote on unfunded mandates independently from 
the vote on the legislation itself.
66
 In the extreme, a point of order may stop the legislation. In addition, the 
very possibility of a point of order being raised can lead to a change of the legislative proposal to ensure 
consistency with UMRA requirements.
67
 Finally, UMRA altered the balance of power within Congress. It 
shifted decisions on unfunded mandates towards the plenary, giving members and party leaders greater 
influence if they can command the necessary majority, while taking power away from the committees, 
which might be much more willing to adopt unfunded mandates, even if their adoption would be 
inefficient or would happen at the cost of federalism.
68
  
One of the weaknesses of UMRA is that points of order can be overridden by a simple majority of the 
Representatives in the House, and since 2006 by 60 Senators in the Senate.
69
 Another oft-mentioned weak 
point is the Act’s narrowness, because the rights it affords do not apply to obligations that States must 
fulfil in order to receive federal assistance.
70
 In addition, UMRA contains a list of situations where its 
application is excluded, for example in case of bills that enforce the constitutional rights of individuals.
71
 
Indeed, an empirical study has shown that UMRA did not substantively decrease the number of unfunded 
                                                 
63
 T J Conlan, J D Riggle and D E Schwartz, ‘Deregulating Federalism? The Politics of Mandate Reform in the 
104th Congress’ (1995) 25 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 23, 37. Unfunded mandates, however, are not 
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65
 E Garrett, ‘Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995’ 
(1997) 45 U Kansas L Rev 1113. 
66
 P L Posner, ‘The Politics of Coercive Federalism’ in T Conlan and P L Posner (eds.), Intergovernmental 
Management for the 21
st
 Century (Brookings Institution Press 2008) 297. 
67
 ibid. 
68
 E Garrett, ‘Framework Legislation and Federalism’ (2008) 83 Notre Dame L Rev 1495, 1521ff. 
69
 Anderson and Constantine, ‘Unfunded mandates’ (n 59) 19. See also Garrett, ‘Framework Legislation and 
Federalism’ (n 68) 1502. 
70
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mandates imposed by the federal government.
72
 Arguably, the reasons included ‘information 
asymmetries, the difficulties of monitoring political agents; and the self-promoting behaviour of mandate-
dispensing officers’.73 Specifically, disorganised voters blame local authorities instead of the State or 
federal government for local tax rises caused by unfunded mandates. This contrasts with interest groups, 
which are well-organised and capable of influencing federal legislators, thus benefiting from the 
mandated services.
74
 
The assessment of UMRA is therefore not entirely positive. Congress adopted a number of new bills 
requiring that more attention be paid to State and local interests during the federal legislative process.
75
 
Yet, UMRA remains the key accomplishment in this respect.  
3.2 The National Conference of State Legislatures 
Although UMRA rules were supposed to limit the enactment of unfunded mandates, legislation 
containing such mandates was still pursued. Consequently, this situation demanded a degree of continuing 
oversight.
76
 The State legislatures’ control over this type of mandates is primarily exercised by the NCSL. 
This section analyses the involvement of State legislatures in scrutinising unfunded mandates in order to 
draw insights for the EU from the experience of US interparliamentary cooperation. 
One of the ways for State governments to influence federal policy making is through intergovernmental 
lobbying during the federal legislative process.
77
 When it comes to parliaments, this is performed by the 
NCSL. The NCLS dates back to 1975 and aims to ‘improve the quality and effectiveness of State 
legislatures; promote policy innovation and communication among State legislatures and ensure State 
legislatures a strong, cohesive voice in the federal system’.78 It has a bipartisan character, serving both 
Republicans and Democrats, and supports both legislators and legislative staff. The Executive Committee 
is the governing body of the NCLS, and is composed of legislators and legislative staff, who broadly 
represent the leadership and top staff of State legislatures. Each State has a liaison officer at the NCSL so 
that State legislators and their staff receive the necessary information. The NCSL meets twice a year, in 
autumn at the Forum and in summer at the Legislative Summit. Those two meetings gather the Standing 
Committees, which are the main institutional feature of the NCSL and which are composed of State 
legislators and legislative staff appointed by State legislatures. They put forward policy directives and 
approve resolutions on State-federal issues, except for when the question at stake is internal to the States 
concerned. Besides committee meetings, the Forum and the Legislative Summit also feature a Business 
Meeting. During those meetings, the legislators vote by jurisdiction on a policy directive at the Forum and 
once adopted at the Legislative Summit, it evolves into an official policy directive. Those directives then 
become a basis for the NCSL’s office in Washington D.C. to lobby Congress, the White House and 
federal agencies. 
                                                 
72
 S Nicholson-Crotty, ‘National Election Cycles and the Intermittent Political Safeguards of Federalism’ (2008) 38 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 295, 304. 
73
 E A Zelinsky, ‘The Unsolved Problem of the Unfunded Mandate’ (1997) 23 Ohio N U L Rev 741, 744. 
74
 ibid. 
75
 See examples of such acts in J Dinan, ‘Strengthening the Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Fate of Recent 
Federalism Legislation in the U.S. Congress’ (2004) 34 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 55, 61. 
76
 See examples in: Anderson and Constantine, ‘Unfunded Mandates’ (n 59) 9. 
77
 J Dinan, ‘Relations between State and National Governments’ in D P Haider-Markel, The Oxford Handbook of 
State and Local Government (OUP 2014) 16. 
78
 See http://www.ncsl.org/aboutus.aspx. 
  
10 
3.3. The Involvement of the NCSL in Unfunded Mandates 
The NCSL opposes the imposition of unfunded federal mandates and the unjustified pre-emption of State 
authority, and strives to provide State legislatures with some flexibility for innovation and responsiveness 
to their citizens’ needs.79 For this purpose, the NCSL monitors mandates in federal laws and lists them in 
the Catalogue of Cost Shifts to States.
80
 Prepared within the NCSL Standing Committee on Budgets and 
Revenue, the Catalogue traces the costs that the federal government imposes on the States by means of 
proposed and adopted legislation in which the CBO has identified a federal mandate. In doing so, the 
NCSL adopts a definition of unfunded mandates that is broader than that provided by UMRA, because it 
includes any federal act that leads to the spending of State or local funds. In contrast, an unfunded 
mandate under UMRA is more narrowly defined as ‘any provision in legislation, statute, or regulation 
that would impose an enforceable duty upon State, local, or tribal governments or that would reduce or 
eliminate the amount of authorisation of appropriations’ that would have covered the costs of existing 
mandates.
81
 This excludes, for example, costs arising from non-mandatory entitlement programs, such as 
Medicaid, which the NCSL sees as unfunded mandates.
82
 In addition, UMRA does not officially declare a 
measure an unfunded mandate if the total annual cost to the States does not exceed a certain minimum 
threshold. 
83
  
The NCSL encourages Congress to avoid imposing new federal unfunded mandates on State and local 
governments. Specifically, the NCSL points out to Congress those cases where legislation should not be 
adopted because it will place a burden on the States. Two examples of this are presented below.  
The first example is the NCSL’s reaction to the federal Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), which was 
adopted in 2003. This Act dealt with the sexual assault of prisoners by setting standards for physical 
space for prisoners and training staff in detention facilities. If these standards were not fulfilled, prisons 
would lose 5 percent of their funding from any federal grant used for ‘prison purposes’, including from 
funds unrelated to the operation of prisons, such as for the reintegration of prisoners. The NCSL 
supported an amendment proposed by Senator Cornyn in September 2014, which sought to restrict the 
scope of the penalty – and thereby reduce the cost to the States – to funds directly related to the 
administration and operation of the prison.
84
 The amendment was supported by the Chairman of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, Patrick Leahy, making it the Leahy/Cornyn amendment. The amendment 
passed the Senate Judiciary Committee by a vote of 13-5, but Congress adjourned before the amendment 
could be voted on in the House, so it was not adopted. 
The second example concerned the draft Digital Accountability and Transparency Act (DATA Act), 
which was passed by the House of Representatives in 2012. It required that recipients of federal funds, 
including State and local governments, submit quarterly reports to a newly created Federal Accountability 
and Spending Transparency Board on how they had used the funds awarded. The NCSL opposed the 
reporting requirement on the grounds that no funds for establishing such a procedure were allocated to the 
                                                 
79
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States and thus the act presented an unfunded federal mandate.
85
 While the bill did not become law 
because the Congress adjourned, a new bill incorporating the essence of the failed DATA Bill was 
enacted in 2014. This law did not contain any unfunded mandates under UMRA, which suggests that the 
NCSL’s action had been successful.86 In sum, the NCSL took a leading role in protecting States from 
costly mandates imposed by federal legislation. 
4 Interparliamentary Cooperation in Switzerland 
Although Swiss cantonal parliaments do not act as guardians of the subsidiarity principle to the same 
extent as NPs in the EU do, they did develop interparliamentary cooperation as a means of strengthening 
their influence on cantonal executives. Hence, their cooperation does not concern vertical federalism as in 
the cases of the EU and the US. In Switzerland, cantonal parliaments cooperate on matters of horizontal 
federalism – those arising between the cantons. The core of the cooperation between cantonal parliaments 
takes place regarding intercantonal treaties, which are traditionally dominated by cantonal executives.
87
 
Cantonal parliaments may only approve such treaties without the possibility to amend them.
88
 In this 
context, cooperation between the cantonal parliaments of Northwestern Switzerland, Western Switzerland 
and the Intercantonal Legislative Conference show the possibilities of overcoming the dominance of the 
cantonal executives. The ongoing discussion on the creation of a National Conference of Cantonal 
Parliaments also indicates that further development of intercantonal parliamentary cooperation is needed. 
The following sections elaborate on the operation of these interparliamentary conferences. 
4.1. The Interparliamentary Conference of Northwestern Switzerland 
The Interparliamentary Conference of Northwestern Switzerland (Interparlamentarische Konferenz der 
Nordwestschweiz – IPK) consists of the representatives of five cantonal parliaments (Bern, Solothurn, 
Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft and Aargau). Each cantonal parliament has six representatives: the 
president and vice-president of the parliament, the former president and three permanent members of the 
cantonal parliament.
89
 The permanent members are part of the working committee.
90
 As a rule, the 
conference meets once a year in October.
91
  
The conference aims to foster the exchange of information between the cantonal parliaments of 
Northwestern Switzerland, in particular on regional issues and projects prior to their discussion in 
cantonal parliaments.
92
 The Secretariat of the conference, the functions of which are performed by the 
Chancellery of Basel-Landschaft canton, facilitates the smooth exchange of information between this 
conference and the conference of the cantonal governments of the same region.
93
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The topics that the conference has dealt with in recent years concerned specific policies, such as energy, 
health, the economic conditions in Northwestern Switzerland, but also the more general questions of 
federalism, such as fiscal transfers and cross-subsidisation between different cantons.
94
 In 2010, the 
conference discussed the purpose of intercantonal cooperation.
95
 It underlined that cooperation between 
cantonal parliaments seeks to strike a balance between efficiency and legitimacy. This is important 
because greater cooperation can facilitate efficiency at the cost of diminished legitimacy given that 
cantons only send a delegation (thus ensuring a lower level of legitimacy because not all members of the 
legislature are represented) and that representation of the voters is indirect.
96
  
4.2. Cooperation of Cantonal Parliaments of Western Switzerland  
The second example of intercantonal cooperation in Switzerland concerns the six French-speaking 
cantons of Western Switzerland (Fribourg, Vaud, Valais, Neuchâtel, Genève and Jura). Their cooperation, 
commonly referred to as CoParl or ParlVer, began in 2002 in the form of the ‘Convention des 
conventions’,97 which had the objective of improving the involvement of cantonal parliaments in 
intercantonal treaties beyond simply accepting or rejecting the final agreement.
98
 Due to the lack of 
impact in practice,
99
 the Convention was replaced in 2011 with ParlVer, which obliges cantonal 
governments to inform parliaments on foreign policy at least once a year.
100
 The main reform, however, is 
the establishment of the Office for Interparliamentary Coordination (Interparlamentarische 
Koordinationsstelle). 
This Office consists of one member and one deputy from each cantonal parliament.
101
 The Office assists 
and coordinates the exchange of information concerning intercantonal and international treaties that affect 
the six cantons.
102
 It also provides and updates the documents on intercantonal cooperation and 
intercantonal treaties to which the cantons of this Swiss region become parties.
103
 The Office also acts as 
a point of contact with the governmental conference of Western Swiss cantons and with the relevant 
regional conferences,
104
 which keep the Office informed of any relevant treaties.
105
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Another reform of ParlVer was the establishment of a clear scope of cooperation, which was missing in 
the Convention des conventions.
106
 If a treaty affects at least two cantons of Western Switzerland in a 
manner that requires parliamentary approval, the parliaments call an interparliamentary commission 
(interparliamentarische Kommission) consisting of seven representatives of each of the cantons.
107
 The 
commission issues an opinion on the treaty, which is forwarded to the executives for consideration.
108
 
Before signing the intercantonal treaty, the executives report back to the commission on the effect of the 
latter’s opinion.109 If necessary, the commission can reply with additional requests.110 Finally, after the 
executives sign the treaty, the relevant parliaments receive it for approval. At this point, they are also 
provided with the opinion prepared by the commission.
111
 
4.3. Intercantonal Legislative Conference 
Following the example of the interparliamentary commission of the cantons of Western Switzerland, the 
German-speaking cantons established the Intercantonal Legislative Conference (Interkantonale 
Legislativkonferenz – ILK) in 2011. This conference similarly aims to enhance the influence of cantonal 
parliaments on intercantonal treaties and is convened only when necessary. This is the case when at least 
two cantons request a discussion of an intercantonal treaty or whenever such a treaty involves endowing 
an institution with parliamentary tasks concerning voting, legislative or oversight functions.
112
 The ILK 
consists of three members from each cantonal parliament.
113
 Unlike Western Switzerland’s 
interparliamentary commission, the ILK has an informal character.
114
 The ILK aims to formulate a 
common position by consensus, which is then communicated to the relevant executives and cantonal 
parliaments.
115
  
The first cantonal treaty for which the ILK was convened concerned the agreement on higher education 
(Hochschulkonkordat) concluded in July 2012.
116
 The ILK submitted an opinion requesting from cantonal 
executives to keep the legislatures informed on higher education policy as well as asking for the creation 
of an intercantonal supervisory body.
117
 The first request succeeded in a number of cantons, while the 
second one was implemented in a couple of intercantonal agreements.
118
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4.4. The National Conference of Cantonal Parliaments 
In addition to the three mechanisms discussed above, there was a debate in the past about the 
establishment of a national conference of cantonal parliaments (Nationale Konferenz der 
Kantonsparlamente – NKK) that would have included representatives of all cantonal parliaments.119 The 
proposal envisaged that the conference would design and evaluate intercantonal treaties as well as 
represent the interests of the cantons within the Swiss federation and within international organisations.
120
 
The proposal for the NKK has not been realised to date.
121
 While 14 cantonal parliaments supported its 
creation, a quorum of 18 parliaments was required for it to be formally established.
122
 
One of the key differences between the CoParl on the one hand and the ILK and NKK on the other, is the 
extent to which cooperation is formalised. While the CoParl is anchored in public law and provides for 
binding involvement of cantonal parliaments, the ILK and NKK represent less formal modes of 
cooperation with little concrete added value for the legislatures in question.
123
 
In sum, in Switzerland, the participation of cantons in federal decision making is safeguarded through the 
Council of States, double majority referendums, legislative initiative, and the possibility of initiating a 
referendum against a federal law. Still, interparliamentary cooperation between cantonal parliaments 
developed horizontally, namely with regard to intercantonal treaties. The rationale for the participation of 
legislatures is therefore different than in the EU and the US, because it does not concern vertical relations 
between the cantons and the federal government. Instead, it developed because of the dominance of 
cantonal executives in intercantonal treaty making. A parallel between the three polities studied in this 
chapter is thus that legislatures and their mutual cooperation represent useful institutional avenues for 
addressing issues related to federalism.  
5 Insights for National Parliaments of the EU Member States 
In order to draw lessons for the EU from the US and Swiss federal systems, the following section deals 
with: the issue of the plurality of forums of interparliamentary cooperation; the involvement of the EP, the 
US Congress and the Swiss Parliament in such forums; the representation of the interests of NPs in the 
EU; and the use of personal liaisons between different institutions. 
5.1. Plurality of Forums 
While the sole forum for cooperation between State legislatures in the US is the NCSL, there are three 
interparliamentary conferences in the EU: one general (COSAC) and two specialised ones (CFSP/CSDP 
conference and ‘Article 13 Conference’ on economic governance).124 Beyond unfunded mandates, the 
NCSL tackles a wide variety of issues ranging from education, health, and infrastructure to budgetary 
matters – without having any specialised sectoral bodies. COSAC could hence be seen as the EU’s 
counterpart of the NCSL, because it discusses both specific policies, such as energy and trade, and more 
general issues, such as EU democratic legitimacy with a focus on the role of NPs in ensuring it. 
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Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty enables the creation of other specialised interparliamentary conferences, 
whose launch involved disagreements related to their rules of procedure and membership.
125
  
To some extent, Switzerland resembles the EU with respect to the number of interparliamentary forums, 
which however mostly specialise in the same subject matter – intercantonal treaties – and are spread 
regionally. One example of EU interparliamentary cooperation that has been constituted similarly to the 
Swiss model refers to the NPs of the Visegrád Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary), which have since 2003 met once a year to discuss both EU policies and procedural aspects of 
their scrutiny, such as subsidiarity control.
126
 They convene in different constellations, usually gathering 
the presidents of these parliaments or the chairpersons of their European affairs or sectoral committees. 
However, this interparliamentary dialogue remains on the periphery of the EU political process, enjoying 
only local significance and visibility. Hence, the existence of different types of interparliamentary forums 
seems to diminish the political visibility of NPs, because the lack of a single overarching parliamentary 
forum disperses the attention given to their pronouncements.  
5.2. Cooperation with the European Parliament  
Arguably, the role of NPs in the EU is best captured by the model of a ‘Euro-national parliamentary 
system’, which demands coordination between different institutional actors – for example, between the 
EP and NPs.
127
 Under the EWS, NPs participate in a dialogue with the Commission, while in 
interparliamentary conferences, they involve members of the EP (MEPs). In contrast, the NCSL does not 
include members of Congress, which, together with the Administration, is the main interlocutor of the 
NCSL.
128
 This is also not the case with Switzerland, because interparliamentary conferences there focus 
on intercantonal rather than canton-federation matters. 
Cooperation between the EP and NPs has in the past led to conflicts, because the EP preferred the 
creation of weak conferences, where it was hard to take collective decisions.
129
 Cooperation within the 
NCSL has a more vertical character, involving State legislators and legislative staff, which is visible in its 
committee structure. Moreover, while some exchange with members of Congress and the federal 
government takes place during two major meetings (the Forum and the Legislative Summit), these 
officials are not members of the NCSL.  
Hence, organising EU interparliamentary cooperation without the EP and without creating a new 
conference merits consideration. If, for example, the CFSP/CSDP and Article 13 conferences followed 
the US model, pertinent issues could be discussed in committees and later in plenary sessions with MEPs. 
Such a system could shield national parliamentarians from possible power struggles with the EP. 
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However, the downside of the exclusion of MEPs would be the limitation of access to EU information 
directly from the EP as well as further antagonism between MPs and MEPs.  
5.3. Aggregation of Interests 
The NCSL seems to aggregate various US State interests and to speak with one voice on behalf of States. 
In Switzerland, although cooperation has a regional character, which does not necessarily mean that the 
cantonal parliaments are univocal, its aim is similarly to search for consensus and coordination in the 
oversight over cantonal executives in intercantonal treaty making. In the EU’s EWS, however, each 
national parliament may prepare its own reasoned opinion, which often reflects the specific political, 
social or geographical concerns of the given parliament. Moreover, NPs were not unanimous on the 
question of the role of COSAC in coordinating the submission of reasoned opinions to the Commission, 
and COSAC itself did not see that as a priority. Accordingly, the collection of reasoned opinions by 
COSAC for the purpose of the EWS stopped with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
130
 
The difference between the roles of the NCSL, the Swiss and EU interparliamentary conferences seems to 
be related to the fact that in their reasoned opinions, or opinions under ‘the political dialogue’, NPs are 
much more motivated by the idiosyncratic interests of the given Member State. In comparison, the NCSL 
coordinates the position of State legislatures on issues that concern all States, at least when it comes to 
unfunded mandates, given that the lack of federal funding affects them all equally. Similarly, the regional 
character of Swiss interparliamentary forums might reduce the divergences between cantonal interests and 
the unwillingness to create a national conference. These insights show one of the possible obstacles for 
interparliamentary cooperation in the EU.  
5.4. Parliamentary Liaison Officers 
The engagement of liaison officers enables the exchange of information between different participants in 
interparliamentary cooperation. In the US, staff members of the NCSL are assigned to a specific State and 
ensure communication between the NCSL and State legislatures.
131
 In Switzerland, one of the functions 
of the administrative bodies of the conferences (e.g. the IPK Secretariat or the Office for 
Interparliamentary Coordination) is to communicate with cantonal executives or the conference of 
cantonal executives. In the EU, national parliamentary representatives in Brussels (NPRs) have become 
an important link between NPs and EU institutions.
132
  The difference lies in the forums that these liaison 
officers link: in the US, it is the conference and State legislatures; in the EU, the link is between the EP 
and NPs; and in Switzerland, it is between the conferences and cantonal governments. These differences 
stem from the different tasks of each of these interparliamentary conferences. 
Establishing a liaison between a national parliament and the COSAC Secretariat or any other EU 
interparliamentary conference would be superfluous, because members of NPs constitute the bulk of 
members of these forums. In addition, NPRs already transmit information on EU affairs from and to NPs. 
No extra liaison seems necessary to ensure ongoing exchange with interparliamentary conferences. In 
contrast, the concept of a network of NPRs sharing information from Brussels might be useful for the US, 
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since only some State legislatures have an office in Washington D.C.
133
 In addition, the D.C. Office of the 
NCSL, as well as the offices and secretariats of the Swiss interparliamentary conferences, might be seen 
as fulfilling such a role on behalf of State and cantonal legislatures collectively. 
6. Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to draw insights from the American and Swiss practices for the 
functions that parliaments perform at non-central level in federal systems. Wechsler originally described 
the political safeguards of federalism in the US as being anchored in the role of States in determining the 
composition of federal institutions. The NCSL developed as an informal political safeguard of federalism 
with an active role in the control of unfunded mandates as an important aspect of fiscal federalism. On the 
other side of the Atlantic, the Swiss constitutional system provides for a number of in-built political 
safeguards of federalism: the Council of States, whose members are directly elected in the cantons; 
‘double majority’ referendums; legislative initiative of the cantons; and the possibility to initiate a 
referendum against a federal law. However, cantonal parliaments created additional forms of 
interparliamentary cooperation within the horizontal dimension of federalism in form of regional 
conferences in order to strengthen their powers in intercantonal treaty making, which is usually controlled 
by cantonal executives. In the case of the EU, the subsidiarity principle and its watchdogs, NPs, became a 
formal political safeguard of federalism under the Lisbon Treaty. Therefore, all of these polities’ 
legislatures assumed roles in developing interparliamentary cooperation, with variations that depended on 
the problems associated with federalism in each case. 
Although State and cantonal legislatures and NPs within the EU deal with different issues of federalism, 
this chapter has shown that they have adopted a resilient approach towards the federal level, be it as 
watchdogs of the subsidiarity principle, scrutinisers of federal legislation that places a financial burden on 
the States, or towards cantonal executives in order to counterbalance the power of governments in the 
making of intercantonal treaties.  
This chapter indicates several conclusions. When it comes to the aggregation of legislatures’ interests, 
NPs in the EU may clearly follow the solutions developed by their US and Swiss counterparts. In the case 
of liaisons between interparliamentary conferences and parliaments, the structural and institutional 
dissimilarities between the Swiss, American and EU conferences discourage the application of solutions 
adopted in Switzerland and the US for the EU, while the EU’s NPRs could be a useful model for the 
NCSL. With regard to the plurality of forums and cooperation with the EP, following the US example in 
the EU would bring some benefits and some disadvantages. On the one hand, parliamentary cooperation 
would benefit from increased visibility and lack of conflicts between the EP and NPs. On the other hand, 
it could lead to a reduction of policy-specific expertise among EU interparliamentary forums, while the 
absence of MEPs could cut NPs off from an important source of information and support in the EU 
legislative process. Finally, the effectiveness and impact of interparliamentary cooperation in federal 
systems remains an issue for further research.w 
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